Why are Most Scientists Atheists If There is Evidence for Belief in God?

Introduction

In the early 20th century, studies showed that scientists were less likely than the general population to believe in the existence of God.1 A survey conducted in 1969 showed that 35% of scientists did not believe that God existed.2 In contrast, recent surveys on religious belief have shown that 90 percent of Americans believe in God and 40 percent attend a place of worship weekly.3 Is a lack of belief in God among scientists due to their higher intelligence and knowledge? A recent study was designed to look at differences in belief among scientists (and other academics) and what factors influence those beliefs.

Religion and Academics

Elaine Ecklund, and Christopher Scheitle questioned 2,198 faculty members in the disciplines of physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, economics, political science, and psychology from 21 elite U.S. research universities.4 Overall, 75% of professors contacted completed the survey. Among the different disciplines, disbelief in the existence of God was not correlated with any particular area of expertise:

Disbelief in God by Academics4
Discipline %
Physics 40.8
Chemistry 26.6
Biology 41.0
Overall 37.6
Sociology 34.0
Economics 31.7
Political Science 27.0
Psychology 33.0
Overall 31.2

Are professors atheists because of their knoweldge?In fact, disbelief in the existence of God was nearly as high in the natural science as in the "soft" sciences. Earlier studies had shown a similar trend, with those in the social sciences regularly attended religious services less often than those in the life sciences.2 So, it doesn't seem that study in any particular field is associated with a disbelief in God's existence. However, several factors unrelated to areas of expertise and training did correlate with belief in God. It was found those scientists who were immigrants (where belief in God is lower) disbelieved in God to a greater degree than those who were born and raised in the U.S. In addition, the study found that scientists come disproportionately from non-religious or religiously liberal backgrounds compared to the general population, suggesting that at least some part of the difference in religiosity between scientists and the general population probably due to religious upbringing rather than scientific training or institutional pressure to be irreligious. Most interesting was the correlation between marital status and number of children on religiosity. Those who were married (especially with children) attended religious services more often. Those who were cohabiting were more likely than married scientists to believe "There is very little truth in any religion." This could be a reflection of wishful thinking!

Another reason why social scientists are atheists comes from the public perception of the social science profession.5 Accordingly, children of liberals, atheists, Jews, and secularists perceive social sciences as more important issues compared with children from religious homes. Therefore, these professions have been abandoned by those brought up with religious backgrounds, leaving mostly secularists and atheists to fill those positions.5

Conclusion

It is true that scientists believe less in the existence of God than the general population of the United States. However, the recent study by Ecklund, and Scheitle reveals that the most important factors in belief were related to upbringing and family status, and not area of expertise. The fact that social scientists as well as those in the natural sciences expressed nearly the same disbelief in God suggests that rejection of God's existence is not a result of knowledge in any particular area of expertise. It is likely that those who have rejected religious morality (i.e., those who were cohabiting) wanted to justify their behavior by saying that there was very little truth in any religion. The conclusion by the authors:

"Instead, particular demographic factors, such as age, marital status, and presence of children in the household, seem to explain some of the religious differences among academic scientists... Most important, respondents who were raised in religious homes, especially those raised in homes where religion was important are most likely to be religious at present."


By R.D.

References:
  1. Leuba, J. 1916. The Belief in God and Immortality: A Psychological, Anthropological, and Statistical Study. Boston: Sherman, French, and Company.
    Leuba, J. 1934. Religious Beliefs of American Scientists. Harper's Magazine 169:291–300.
  2. Trow, Martin and Associates. 1969. Carnegie Commission National Survey of Higher Education: Faculty Study [computer file]. Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, Survey Research Center [producer]. Ann Arbor, MI: University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].
  3. Gallup, G. Jr. and D. M. Lindsay. 1999. Surveying the Religious Landscape: Trends in U.S. Religious Beliefs. Harrisburg, PA, Morehouse Publishing.
    Hadaway, C. K., P. L. Marler, and M. Chaves. 1993. What the Polls Don't Show: A Closer Look at U.S. Church Attendance. American Sociological Review 58: 741–52.
  4. Ecklund, E. H. and C. P. Scheitle. 2007. Religion among Academic Scientists: Distinctions, Disciplines, and Demographics. Social Problems 54: 289–307.
  5. Fosse, E. 2010. Why are professor liberal.

Source

The moral implications of Darwinism


Human life seems to have lost its dignity and value. Ask a Muslim in Serbia, a Ba’hai in Iran, or a Christian in the Sudan. Observe Jack Kevorkian assisting suicide and then being embraced as a serious and even valuable contributor to our moral conversation. The question looms: What is important about being human?

Time was when we could blame barbarity on the pagan, the uncivilized, or the fanatics. Names spring to mind: Hitler, Ghengis Khan, or Pol Pot. But now we’re not talking about the past. We are at the edge of the 21st century. Knowledge has been increased: astronauts crisscross space; satellites circle the globe bringing information from everywhere to everywhere in a few moments; galaxies beyond our own have become objects of study; and genes within our bodies are searched and researched for a clue to the mysteries of human life. And yet there remains the question—simple, yet most profound: What is so special about being human?

For many philosophers, including some who call themselves Christians, the answer is increasingly, nothing much. With all of today’s scientific knowledge and technical achievements, and with the historical record in full view, human beings are still tempted to violate basic human rights.

After World War II, the Nuremberg Trials bared the evil that lurks in the human heart, and showed how even the most cultured and civilized society can crawl into the moral sewers, virtually erasing the spiritual meaning of “humanity.” The lessons of that war drove the United Nations to pass, in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This document affirmed the dignity and equality of every human being, requiring civilized societies to protect the weak from the strong. The declaration still stands. Why, then, are we still talking about human rights and dignity?

The myth of origins

The answer may be found in what is embraced as the scientific explanation of the origin of life and its diversity, a story that leaves out the biblical God. This perspective is clearly expounded in James Rachels’ 1990 book, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (New York: Oxford University Press). The author reasons from a foundation of naturalistic evolution. His conclusion, robustly supported, is that Darwinism completely undermines the doctrine of human dignity. Human beings occupy no special place in the moral order; we are simply another form of animal.

This view and concern about it are not new. In 1859, Bishop Samuel Wilberforce warned that Darwinism was “absolutely incompatible” with Christianity’s “whole representation of the moral and spiritual condition of man.” The Southern Baptist Convention of the United States echoed Wilberforce in 1987. But there is no unanimity among Christians. A century ago Henry Ward Beecher, the renowned preacher, suggested that the evolutionary perspective added to the glory of God’s creation. Pope John Paul II is willing to accept the evolutionary process as God’s means of creating the human body (although not the “spirit,” which he insists is God’s immediate creation).

Even scientists are divided on this issue. Some (such as Steven Jay Gould) say tha Darwinism and religion are not incompatible, that one can be both a theist and a Darwinist; while others (William Provine) assert that Darwinism makes all supernatural religion not just superfluous, but untenable.

Rachels argues (“Must a Darwinian Be Skeptical?”) that teleology (direction and purpose) in nature is irrevocably destroyed by Darwinism. Without teleology, religion must “retreat to something like deism,…no longer…support[ing] the doctrine of human dignity” (pp. 127, 128). This argument is a powerful one, and must be refuted if a religious Darwinist is to salvage the biblical teaching that humans are created in God’s image and have a special place in the divine order. As Rachels reminds us, “The ‘image of God’ thesis does not go along with just any theistic view. It requires a theism that sees God as actively designing man and the world as a home for man.”

In “How Different Are Humans From Animals?” Rachels concludes that Darwinism destroys any foundation for a morally significant difference between humans and animals. If humans descended from primitive ape-like creatures by natural selection, they may be physically different from non-human animals, but cannot be essentially so. Certainly not different in any way that gives every human more rights than any animal. In Rachels’ words, “one cannot reasonably make distinctions in morals where none exist in fact.” He calls his doctrine “moral individualism,” and it rejects “the traditional doctrine of human dignity” along with the idea that human life has any inherent worth that non-human life lacks.

Moral individualism

In “Morality Without Humans Being Special,” Rachels deals first with human equality, and then rejects it! Humans are entitled “to be treated as equals” only if there are no “relevant differences” between them. Rachels, lacking belief in sin and its power (and ignoring history), expects that “relevant differences” will be used in distinguishing individuals only, and not genders, races, religions, etc. Accepting Darwinian concepts extends the analysis to non-human animals as well, yielding no automatic superiority of human claims over those of rabbits, pigs, or whales. Under “moral individualism,” when faced with using a human or a chimpanzee for a lethal medical experiment, we can no longer decide the question by noting that the chimp is not human. “We would have to ask what justifies using this particular chimp, and not that particular human, and the answer would have to be in terms of their individual characteristics, not simply their group memberships” (p. 174).

Given the crucial role of “relevant differences” in this ethic, one looks for some formal definition of the term. Rachels provides none. Instead we get “something of how the concept works” in an example about testing cosmetics on the eyes of rabbits, and in a vague hypothetical: “If it is thought permissible to treat A, but not B, in a certain way, we first ask why B may not be treated in that way.…If A and B differ only in ways that do not figure in the explanation of why it is wrong to treat B in the specified manner, then the differences are irrelevant” (p. 181). This is no bulwark against the selfishness and evil we see in ourselves and in our fellow human beings.

Experience demonstrates that any soft, relativistic ethical standard will be twisted into whatever shape is needed to allow us to do whatever we want to our fellow human beings. Examples abound: chattel slavery; racial and religious persecution; one million annual U.S. abortions; the epidemic of abandoned, abused, and murdered babies; laws permitting assisted suicide and euthanasia; ethnic cleansing; etc. We must have a “bright line” standard of our obligations to every member of the human family. This is the difference between morality and amorality. There is no middle ground.

Darwinism and amorality

The connection between Darwinism and amorality is now explicit. In the New York Times Magazine of November 3, 1997, Stephen Pinker wrote about “evolutionary psychology.” He tells us that “moral philosophers have concluded that. . .our immature neonates don’t possess [the right to life] any more than mice do,” and alleges that “neonaticide may be a product of maternal wiring” since it has “been practiced and accepted in most cultures throughout history.” He thus ties infanticide directly to our evolutionary ancestry and the Darwinian struggle for survival, which sometimes demands that mothers kill their young in order to further their own reproductive future. In articles such as this, the formerly unthinkable is being presented as reasonable and acceptable. We are being “softened up” for a change in community morality—one holding that some humans deserve respect and protection, but that others do not, and can be killed with impunity. You can see this process at work today: in academic discourse, and increasingly in the popular media.

Just 50 years ago, every nation voting at the United Nations flatly rejected this kind of reasoning. The emerging ethic in the West is a direct repudiation of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In its preamble, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously (with eight abstentions) declared that “the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world” is “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.” In the Articles themselves, we find that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (Article 1); “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind” (Article 2); “Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person” (Article 3); “Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law” (Article 6); and “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law” (Article 7). This is not equivocal language; there can be no confusion about what was meant. Accepting what Rachels and Pinker are offering means turning our back on the settled wisdom of the past.

Maturity (and our safety) demands honest reflection. A system of ethics based on moral relativism will always end up with the strong in charge and the weak beneath their heel. The Darwinist worldview, followed to its logical conclusion, leads us nowhere else, and this should be sufficient for us to reject it. Perhaps we should not be surprised to find the secular and wholly naturalistic Darwinists espousing such a cold-blooded and utilitarian philosophy, but what is truly astounding is the number of ethicists, philosophers, and others who identify themselves as Christians and yet urge us to adopt an ethic that leads us down the Darwinist path.

The argument for moral relativism is subtle and appealing on the surface. Often it begins by reaffirming the biological (and biblical) truth that we are human from the moment of conception. But, then we are told that there is a difference between a “human” and a “person,” and that “personhood” is the category a human must attain in order to have a right to life. The qualifications for “personhood” vary—but generally they include the possession of self-consciousness as a necessary condition to be a “person” with full moral status (for instance, to have a right not to be killed). Of course, no human being is born with self-consciousness, and many of us may lose our self-consciousness, temporarily or permanently, due to injury, illness or age. Here, then, is the convergence of Darwin’s philosophy and that of some of today’s Christian thinkers, “moral individualism” meeting “proximate personhood.”

Moral individualism (or the “personhood” ethic) and the U.N. Charter’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights are colliding moral galaxies; they are totally incompatible. The galaxy represented by the U.N. Declaration is founded on the Judeo-Christian moral tradition—a tradition going back for millennia. The galaxy of “moral individualism” purports to be founded on human reason, and is expressed in statements that begin with, “I argue…,” “I see…,” or “I contend….” “Moral individualism” and its clones propose that both humans and non-human animals are to be judged by the same relativistic criteria. In this moral universe, human beings have lost their inalienable right to life, something that Christians have always granted because “God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them” (Genesis 1:27, NIV).

Pushed off the pedestal

Pushing humans off the pedestal of dignity on which the Bible has placed them has implications for everyone, not just for the comatose patients, the handicapped newborns, the old and feeble, and others not like “us.” Under the ethic of “moral individualism,” there is no principle preventing one race from classifying other races as less than fully human and enslaving or killing them. There is no principle calling to account those who seek to demote others to the status of “non-persons.” There is no principle condemning parents who use pre-natal testing to determine the sex of the unborn and then abort the female. There is no principle to stop a society from deciding that full human status isn’t reached until age 3 or 4, and establishing centers for the elimination of any unwanted “non-persons.” There is no principle to prevent the cloning of a (very rich) individual, or the use of the human being that results as a stock of spare parts. We may recoil at these suggestions, but the hard truth is that when we abandon the biblical imperative that innocent human life is sacred and must not be touched, we are all at risk, because when the strong take over, “might makes right.”

When Christian ethicists reach the same conclusions as Darwinists about our obligations to our fellow humans, it’s time to do some careful thinking. God created us, and He knows the evil of which we are capable. For this reason, He instructed us to treat all humans as worthy of equal dignity and respect. Neither “moral individualism” nor the ethic of “personhood” is compatible with the traditional interpretation of Scripture, and this should be reason enough for people of faith to reject them outright. But, in addition, for those whose faith is weak, history offers many demonstrations that before every slaughter there has been a division of the human population into “our group” (protected) and “those other guys” (not protected) that makes it permissible to do the killing. Most of the current relativistic ethicists have no such thing in mind. They are simply trying to create a non-dogmatic, rationalistic base for behavior they deem proper. This effort has been tried before, invariably with tragic consequences.

I believe that James Rachels succeeds in his argument: One cannot be a Darwinist and logically hold the traditional view that human life is sacred. The more immediate question for the “people of the Book” seems even more relevant: Can one hold that human life is not sacred and still be a Christian?

by Earl Aagaard (Ph.D., Colorado State University)

Biological Computers



A collection of articles on DNA computers and cell signaling provides some real insight into how the theory of evolution impedes scientific progress.

From Science Against Evolution

Yes, we know Scientific American is just a science tabloid that presents pseudo-science in a sensational manner. We subscribe simply to monitor the outrageous claims they make about the theory of evolution from time to time. That’s why we were shocked that they printed an excellent, informative story about a simple computer that plays tic-tac-toe using synthetic DNA as logic elements. It sounds bizarre, but this isn’t the first time that something like this has been done.

Researchers reported logic gates based on synthetic molecules as long ago as the early 1990s. 1

You might wonder why one would bother to build a computer using DNA. After all, modern silicon-based electronic computers are tiny, powerful, and can do almost everything. Why try to compete with them?

We did not aim, however, to compete with silicon-based computers. Instead, because Stojanovic had just finished a brief stint with a pharmaceutical company, we settled on developing a system that could be useful for making “smart” therapeutic agents, such as drugs that could sense and analyze conditions in a patient and respond appropriately with no human intervention after being injected. For example, one such smart agent might monitor glucose levels in the blood and decide when to release insulin. Thus, our molecular logic gates had to be biocompatible. 2

Using this new science, we have constructed molecular versions of logic gates that can operate in water solution. Our goal in building these DNA-based computing modules is to develop nanoscopic machines that could exist in living organisms, sensing conditions and making decisions based on what they sense, then responding with actions such as releasing medicine or killing specific cells. 3

Baby Steps First

Their goal is to create chemically-based systems that act like computers in the human body. That’s a pretty ambitious project. One has to work up to that ability step-by-step. So, they started with the same simple program that digital computer programmers wrote more than 50 years ago.

The first known video game, OXO (or Noughts and Crosses, 1952) for the EDSAC computer played perfect games of tic-tac-toe against a human opponent. 4

We have demonstrated some of the abilities of our DNA gates by building automata that play perfect games of tic-tac-toe. The human player adds solutions of DNA strands to signal his or her moves, and the DNA computer responds by lighting up the square it has chosen to take next. Any mistake by the human player will be punished with defeat. Although game playing is a long way from our ultimate goals, it is a good test of how readily the elementary molecular computing modules can be combined in plug-and-play fashion to perform complicated functions, just as the silicon-based gates in modern computers can be wired up to form the complex logic circuits that carry out everything that computers do for us today. 5

Since there are only 76 ways to put X’s and O’s on a 3x3 matrix, it is relatively simple to enumerate all the possibilities, and use a lookup table to see where to move next, and that’s basically what they did. The second version of their tic-tac-toe computer is called MAYA-II.

The sheer size of this automaton made building and testing MAYA-II an enormous challenge. One of us (Macdonald) led the project and trained several high school students to test automata, mostly during summers and on Saturdays. The students checked all 76 games multiple times. They had to make changes in MAYA-II’s design to deal with several problems (and then recheck all the games after each tweak).

Our chief concern going into the project was that some sequences might bind in unintended places. Our computer-modeling tools were not advanced enough to be able to predict such difficulties. In fact, spurious binding was relatively rare. Instead the more serious problem turned out to be individual gates cleaving their substrates at different rates. We (or, rather, our students) had to adjust concentrations and structures to correct for this variability. We also quickly discovered that some gates acted differently within a mixture than they did on their own, necessitating other redesigns. Finally, after three consecutive summers and many Saturdays, through some changes of inputs and many small adjustments of gate sequences and concentrations, our team had a system in which we could clearly distinguish active and inactive gates in all wells, for all the games, reproducibly. 6

So, it is possible to create biologic systems which respond intelligently to external stimuli; but it took more than three summers of intelligent design! Imagine how long it would have taken using random trial and error.

Cell Signaling

Ironically, at the same time as this Scientific American article came out, Science magazine published a special report on cell signaling. It contained several interesting observations about the biologic computations that occur in living things.

Mammalian species use over 3000 signaling proteins and over 15 second messengers to build hundreds of cell-specific signaling systems. Many of the signaling components have multiple upstream regulators and downstream targets, creating a web of connectivity within and between signaling pathways. The presence of multiple feedback loops in these systems poses a challenge to understanding how receptor inputs control cellular behavior. 7

Signaling proteins operate in complex networks in cells. The networks are wired into long serial chains, and these chains are arrayed in numerous parallel pathways that diverge from common inputs, converge onto intermediate nodes, and diverge again to many different effectors. Signals from the external world that are detected at the cell membrane are transmitted in the plane of the membrane and through the cytoplasm, with feedback and feed-forward loops onto organelles and the nucleus. The upshot of this complex connectivity is the control of outputs as diverse as membrane transport, cell metabolism, protein translation, cell shape and migration, gene transcription, cell cycle, and cell survival. The shear number of signaling proteins and complexity of their connectivity is staggering, and the depictions in textbooks and on glossy posters from chemical companies are as dense and as difficult to decipher as spirographs. 8

It makes the MAYA-II look rather pathetic by comparison. Animal bodies already have many chemical computers that do the kinds of things the authors of the Scientific American article want to do. The specific chemical computer the authors of the Scientific American article want to simulate is called, “the pancreas.” But there are many other, less well known biological computers that control “outputs as diverse as membrane transport, cell metabolism, protein translation, cell shape and migration, gene transcription, cell cycle, and cell survival. The shear number of signaling proteins and complexity of their connectivity is staggering.”

Your Point of View Matters

Let’s look at this from an evolutionary perspective, and then from an intelligent design perspective.

If one takes an evolutionary approach, believing that these 3000 signaling proteins arose by chance, then the focus of study will be an analysis of the probabilities necessary to make this happen. Scientists will determine the number of independent variables, the number of ways they can be combined, speculate on the rate at which they can combine, and compute the average time it would take for the right combination to occur. This will necessarily lead to the conclusion that evolution must have been going on for a very, very long time for all these lucky breaks to happen.

Here’s how an evolutionary bias has affected one scientist in particular.

Given a signaling center, one can easily imagine how it can organize the pattern of cell differentiation in its neighborhood. But how does the signaling center itself arise? If we start with a more or less homogeneous field of cells, what internal mechanism can make one region different from another and break the symmetry? 9

Subconsciously, he must realize that this could not have happened by chance. But since there is no other explanation than chance, he imagines that cell differentiation takes place in a neighborhood. The mechanism by which cell differentiation takes place isn’t completely understood. (If it were, there would be no need for stem cell research.) But even so, he imagines that there must be some natural process that arose by chance because it happens. But even given his willingness to imagine the unimaginable, he still can’t imagine how the signaling center arose by chance in the first place. So, he is likely to focus his research by starting with a “more or less homogeneous field of cells” and look for some random process that “can make one region different from another and break the symmetry.”

But, if one believes that life is the product of intelligent design, then the scientist is going to ignore chance and focus on the underlying design philosophy of life. That is, the scientist will seek to understand what processes are taking place, and then seek to understand why those processes exist, and what their purpose is. He isn’t going to waste time trying to find some way that these processes might have arisen by chance.

The theory of evolution hinders scientific progress because it ignores the possibility that life operates as it does for a reason. Sometimes evolutionists claim that creationists cop out by saying, “God did it.” But, in fact, it is the evolutionists who cop out by saying, “There’s no reason for it—it just happened by chance.” If you don’t think there is a reason, then you won’t look for the reason—you just give the credit to luck.

Mum’s the Word

Despite the theory of evolution, science is progressing. Scientists actually are studying cell signaling. But, to keep their sponsors happy, they don’t ever mention that signaling is a form of communication, and communication implies intelligence. There is a reason why data is sent from the sensor to the actuator. There really is a purpose to it, but they hope that never occurs to anyone else.

Scientists aren’t free to talk about purpose because of the political and philosophical implications that result from such a conversation. But it has to be in the back of their minds. It slips out every now and again, as in this summary paragraph.

Conclusions
Remote and noninvasive manipulation of proteins with light provides a powerful approach for studying and reengineering signaling pathways by selectively establishing a fast and reversible remote control over specific proteins at specific locations within a cell or organism. 10

Nothing can be reengineered unless it was engineered in the first place. The signaling pathways were designed, on purpose! If they really happened by chance in the first place, then it is pointless to study them. Just try random combination after random combination and see what happens. If that’s the way they arose, then more will arise through the same technique.

The MAYA-II computer didn’t figure out how to play tic-tac-toe all by itself. It took a conscious arrangement of biologic components by intelligent designers to achieve a goal. It would be foolish to try to reverse engineer it by examining the probabilities that those components arose and were connected by chance.

Intelligent design is a valid scientific hypothesis. But since it is incompatible with the failing theory of evolution, some people feel it must be suppressed.

Brain Dopamine Receptor Density Correlates with Social Status


People have typically viewed the benefits that accrue with social status primarily from the perspective of external rewards. A new paper in the February 1st issue of Biological Psychiatry suggests that there are internal rewards as well.

Dr. Martinez and colleagues found that increased and increased social support correlated with the density of D2/D3 receptors in the striatum, a region of the brain that plays a central role in reward and motivation, where dopamine plays a critical role in both of these behavioral processes.

The researchers looked at social status and social support in normal healthy volunteers who were scanned using positron emission tomography (PET), a technology that allowed them to image dopamine type 2 receptors in the brain.

This data suggests that people who achieve greater social status are more likely to be able to experience life as rewarding and stimulating because they have more targets for dopamine to act upon within the striatum.

Dr. Martinez explains their findings: "We showed that low levels of dopamine receptors were associated with low social status and that high levels of were associated with higher social status. The same type of association was seen with the volunteer's reports of social support they experience from their friends, family, or significant other."

Dr. John Krystal, Editor of commented, "These data shed interesting light into the drive to achieve social status, a basic social process. It would make sense that people who had higher levels of D2 receptors, i.e., were more highly motivated and engaged by social situations, would be high achievers and would have higher levels of ."

These data also may have implications for understanding the vulnerability to alcohol and substance abuse, as the work of Dr. Nora Volkow, the Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and colleagues suggests that low levels of D2/D3 receptors may contribute to the risk for alcoholism among individuals who have family members who abuse alcohol. The current data suggest that vulnerable individuals with low D2/D3 receptors may be vulnerable to lower social status and social supports, and these social factors have previously been suggested as contributors to the risk for alcohol and substance use.

These findings are particularly exciting because they put human neurobiology into a social context, and we humans are fundamentally social creatures. It is in these social contexts that the biological effects on behavior obtain their real meaning.

More information: The article is “Dopamine Type 2/3 Receptor Availability in the Striatum and Social Status in Human Volunteers” by Diana Martinez, Daria Orlowska, Rajesh Narendran, Mark Slifstein, Fei Liu, Dileep Kumar, Allegra Broft, Ronald Van Heertum, and Herbert D. Kleber. Martinez, Orlowska, Slifstein, Liu, Kumar, Broft, and Kleber are affiliated with the Department of Psychiatry, while Van Heertum is with the Department of Radiology, all at Columbia University, College of Physicians and Surgeons, New York, New York. Narendran is from the Department of Radiology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The article appears in Biological Psychiatry, Volume 67, Issue 3 (February 1, 2010).

Provided by Elsevier

Source: Physorg